Another contrast is the one between strong, and somewhat aggressive attachment nationalism and a mild one patriotism , dating back at least to George Orwell see his essay. Despite these definitional worries, there is a fair amount of agreement about the classical, historically paradigmatic form of nationalism. Territorial sovereignty has traditionally been seen as a defining element of state power and essential for nationhood.
It was extolled in classic modern works by Hobbes, Locke, and Rousseau and is returning to center stage in the debate, though philosophers are now more skeptical see below. Issues surrounding the control of the movement of money and people in particular immigration and the resource rights implied in territorial sovereignty make the topic politically central in the age of globalization and philosophically interesting for nationalists and anti-nationalists alike.
Consequences are varied and quite interested for more see below, especially section 2. In breaking down the issue, we have mentioned the importance of the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity.
This point raises two sorts of questions. First, the descriptive ones:. This section discusses the descriptive questions, starting with 1a and 1b ;the normative questions are addressed in Section 3 on the moral debate. If one wants to enjoin people to struggle for their national interests, one must have some idea about what a nation is and what it is to belong to a nation.
So, in order to formulate and ground their evaluations, claims, and directives for action, pro-nationalist thinkers have expounded theories of ethnicity, culture, nation, and state. Their opponents have in turn challenged these elaborations. Now, some presuppositions about ethnic groups and nations are essential for the nationalist, while others are theoretical elaborations designed to support the essential ones. Since nationalism is particularly prominent with groups that do not yet have a state, a definition of nation and nationalism purely in terms of belonging to a state is a non-starter.
The first extreme option has been put forward by a small but distinguished band of theorists. At the other extreme, and more typically, nationalist claims are focused upon the non-voluntary community of common origin, language, tradition, and culture: the classic ethno-nation is a community of origin and culture, including prominently a language and customs.
One cannot choose to be a member; instead, membership depends on the accident of origin and early socialization. However, commonality of origin has become mythical for most contemporary candidate groups: ethnic groups have been mixing for millennia. This is the kind of definition that would be accepted by most parties in the debate today. So defined, the nation is a somewhat mixed category, both ethno-cultural and civic, but still closer to the purely ethno-cultural than to the purely civic extreme.
In social and political science one usually distinguishes two kinds of views, but there is a third group, combining element from both. The first are modernist views that see nationalism as born in modern times, together with nation-states. The third, quite plausible kind of view, distinct from both primordialism-ethno-symbolism and modernism, has been initiated by W.
Connor So, the origins of nationalism predate the modern state, and its emotional content remains up to our times Conversi , but the actual statist organization is, indeed, modern. However, nation-state is a nationalist dream and fiction, never really implemented, due to the inescapable plurality of social groups.
So much for the three dominant perspectives on the origin of nationalism. Indeed, the older authors—from great thinkers like Herder and Otto Bauer to the propagandists who followed their footsteps—took great pains to ground normative claims upon firm ontological realism about nations: nations are real, bona fide entities. Let us now turn to question 1c about the nature of pro-national attitudes. The explanatory issue that has interested political and social scientists concerns ethno-nationalist sentiment, the paradigm case of a pro-national attitude.
Is it as irrational, romantic, and indifferent to self-interest as it might seem on the surface? The issue has divided authors who see nationalism as basically irrational and those who try to explain it as being in some sense rational.
Authors who see it as irrational propose various explanations of why people assent to irrational views. But where does such false consciousness come from? On the opposite side, the famous critic of nationalism Elie Kedourie thinks this irrationality is spontaneous. A decade and a half ago Liah Greenfeld went as far as linking nationalism to mental illness in her provocative article see also her book. On the opposite side, Michael Walzer has offered a sympathetic account of nationalist passion in his Authors relying upon the Marxist tradition offer various deeper explanations.
Some authors claim that it is often rational for individuals to become nationalists Hardin Can one rationally explain the extremes of ethno-national conflict? Authors like Russell Hardin propose to do so in terms of a general view of when hostile behavior is rational: most typically, if an individual has no reason to trust someone, it is reasonable for that individual to take precautions against the other.
If both sides take precautions, however, each will tend to see the other as increasingly inimical. It then becomes rational to start treating the other as an enemy.
Mere suspicion can thus lead by small, individually rational steps to a situation of conflict. It is relatively easy to spot the circumstances in which this general pattern applies to national solidarities and conflicts see also Wimmer We pointed out at the very beginning of the entry that nationalism focuses upon 1 the attitude that the members of a nation have when they care about their national identity, and 2 the actions that the members of a nation take when seeking to achieve or sustain some form of political sovereignty.
The politically central point is 2 : the actions enjoined by the nationalist. To these we now turn, beginning with sovereignty and territory, the usual foci of a national struggle for independence. They raise an important issue:. The classical answer is that a state is required. A more liberal answer is that some form of political autonomy suffices. Once this has been discussed, we can turn to the related normative issues:. Consider first the classical nationalist answer to 2a.
Developments of this line of thought often state or imply specific answers to 2b , and 2c , i. However, classical nationalism is not only concerned with the creation of a state but also with its maintenance and strengthening. Classical nationalists are usually vigilant about the kind of culture they protect and promote and about the kind of attitude people have to their nation-state.
This watchful attitude carries some potential dangers: many elements of a given culture that are universal or simply not recognizably national may fall prey to such nationalist enthusiasms. Classical nationalism in everyday life puts various additional demands on individuals, from buying more expensive home-produced goods in preference to cheaper imported ones to procreating as many future members of the nation as one can manage see Yuval-Davies , and Yack Besides classical nationalism and its more radical extremist cousins , various moderate views are also now classified as nationalist.
Indeed, the philosophical discussion has shifted to these moderate or even ultra-moderate forms, and most philosophers who describe themselves as nationalists propose very moderate nationalist programs. Nationalism in this wider sense is any complex of attitudes, claims, and directives for action ascribing a fundamental political, moral, and cultural value to nation and nationality and deriving obligations for individual members of the nation, and for any involved third parties, individual or collective from this ascribed value.
The main representative of this group of views is liberal nationalism , proposed by authors like Miller, Tamir, and Gans see below. Nationalisms in this wider sense can vary somewhat in their conceptions of the nation which are often left implicit in their discourse , in the grounds for and degree of its value, and in the scope of their prescribed obligations.
Liberal nationalists see liberal-democratic principles and pro-national attitudes as belonging together.
Of course, some things have to be sacrificed: we must acknowledge that either the meaningfulness of a community or its openness must be sacrificed to some extent as we cannot have them both.
How much of each is to give way is left open, and of course, various liberal nationalists take different views of what precisely the right answer is. They both see the feeling of national identity as a feeling that promotes solidarity, and solidarity as means for increased social justice Tamir , in particular ch.
Liberal nationalists diverge about the value of multiculturalism. Kymlicka takes it as basic for his picture of liberalism while Tamir dismisses it without much ado: multicultural, multiethnic democracies have a very poor track record, she claims Tamir lists two kinds of reasons that guarantee special political status to nations. The historical development of liberalism turned it into a universalistic, anti-communitarian principle; this has been a fatal mistake that can be and should be corrected by the liberal nationalist synthesis.
Can we revive the unifying narratives of our nationality without sacrificing the liberal inheritance of freedom and rights? Liberal nationalism answers in the affirmative. Interestingly, Tamir combines this high regard of nation with an extreme constructivist view of its nature: nations are mental structures that exist in the minds of their members Is liberal nationalism implemented anywhere in the present world, or is it more of an ideal, probably end-state theory, that proposes a picture of a desirable society?
Judging by the writings of liberal nationalists, it is the latter, although presented as a relatively easily reachable ideal, combining two traditions that are already well implemented in political reality. The variations of nationalism most relevant for philosophy are those that influence the moral standing of claims and of recommended nationalist practices.
The central theoretical nationalist evaluative claims can be charted on the map of possible positions within political theory in the following useful but somewhat simplified and schematic way.
Nationalist claims featuring the nation as central to political action must answer two crucial general questions. First, is there one kind of large social group that is of special moral importance?
The nationalist answer is that there certainly is one, namely, the nation. Moreover, when an ultimate choice is to be made, say between ties of family, or friendship, and the nation, the latter has priority. Are they based on voluntary or involuntary membership in the group? On the philosophical map, pro-nationalist normative tastes fit nicely with the communitarian stance in general: most pro-nationalist philosophers are communitarians who choose the nation as the preferred community in contrast to those of their fellow communitarians who prefer more far-ranging communities, such as those defined by global religious traditions.
Before proceeding to moral claims, let us briefly sketch the issues and viewpoints connected to territory and territorial rights that are essential for nationalist political programs. Its primary importance resides in sovereignty and all the associated possibilities for internal control and external exclusion. What about the grounds for the demand for territorial rights?
Nationalist and pro-nationalist views mostly rely on the attachment that members of a nation have to national territory and to the formative value of territory for a nation to justify territorial claims see Miller and Meisels These attachment views stand in stark contrast to more pragmatic views about territorial rights as means for conflict resolution e.
Another quite popular alternative is the family of individualistic views grounding territorial rights in rights and interests of individuals. We now pass to the normative dimension of nationalism.
We shall first describe the very heart of the nationalist program, i. These claims can be seen as answers to the normative subset of our initial questions about 1 pro-national attitudes and 2 actions. We will see that these claims recommend various courses of action: centrally, those meant to secure and sustain a political organization for the given ethno-cultural national community thereby making more specific the answers to our normative questions 1e , 1f , 2b , and 2c.
Finally, we shall discuss various lines of pro-nationalist thought that have been put forward in defense of these claims. To begin, let us return to the claims concerning the furthering of the national state and culture. These are proposed by the nationalist as norms of conduct. The philosophically most important variations concern three aspects of such normative claims:.
Universalizing nationalism is the political program that claims that every ethno-nation should have a state that it should rightfully own and the interests of which it should promote. Particularistic nationalism is the political program claiming that some ethno-nation should have its state, without extending the claim to all ethno-nations.
It claims thus either. The most difficult and indeed chauvinistic sub-case of particularism, i. Serious theoretical nationalists usually defend only the universalist variety, whereas the nationalist-in-the-street most often defends the egoistic indeterminate one. Put starkly, the view is that morality ends at the boundaries of the nation-state; beyond there is nothing but anarchy.
Recall the initial normative question centered around 1 attitudes and 2 actions. Is national partiality justified, and to what extent? What actions are appropriate to bring about sovereignty? In particular, are ethno-national states and institutionally protected ethno- national cultures goods independent from the individual will of their members, and how far may one go in protecting them?
The philosophical debate for and against nationalism is a debate about the moral validity of its central claims. In particular, the ultimate moral issue is the following: is any form of nationalism morally permissible or justified, and, if not, how bad are particular forms of it? In some situations they seem plausible: for instance, the plight of some stateless national groups—the history of Jews and Armenians, the historical and contemporary misfortunes of Kurds—lends credence to the idea that having their own state would have solved the worst problems.
Still, there are good reasons to examine nationalist claims more carefully. The most general reason is that it should first be shown that the political form of the nation-state has some value as such, that a national community has a particular, or even central, moral and political value, and that claims in its favor have normative validity. Once this is established, a further defense is needed.
Some classical nationalist claims appear to clash—at least under normal circumstances of contemporary life—with various values that people tend to accept. Some of these values are considered essential to liberal-democratic societies, while others are important specifically for the flourishing of creativity and culture. Liberal nationalists are aware of the difficulties of the classical approach, and soften the classical claims, giving them only a prima facie status.
Such thoughtful pro-nationalist writers have participated in an ongoing philosophical dialogue between proponents and opponents of the claim. Further lines of thought built upon these considerations can be used to defend very different varieties of nationalism, from radical to very moderate ones. For brevity, each line of thought will be reduced to a brief argument; the actual debate is more involved than one can represent in a sketch.
Some prominent lines of criticism that have been put forward in the debate will be indicated in brackets see Miscevic The main arguments in favor of nationalism will be divided into two sets. The first set of arguments defends the claim that national communities have a high value, sometime seen as coming from the interests of their individual member e.
The first set will be presented in more detail since it has formed the core of the debate. It depicts the community as the source of value or as the transmission device connecting its members to some important values. The general form of deep communitarian arguments is as follows. First, the communitarian premise: there is some uncontroversial good e. Then comes the claim that the ethno-cultural nation is the kind of community ideally suited for this task.
Then follows the statist conclusion: in order for such a community to preserve its own identity and support the identity of its members, it has to assume always or at least normally the political form of a state.
The conclusion of this type of argument is that the ethno-national community has the right to an ethno-national state and the citizens of the state have the right and obligation to favor their own ethnic culture in relation to any other.
Although the deeper philosophical assumptions in the arguments stem from the communitarian tradition, weakened forms have also been proposed by more liberal philosophers. A liberal nationalist might claim that these are not the central values of political life but are values nevertheless. Moreover, the diametrically opposing views, pure individualism and cosmopolitanism, do seem arid, abstract, and unmotivated by comparison.
By cosmopolitanism we refer to moral and political doctrines claiming that. Confronted with opposing forces of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, many philosophers opt for a mixture of liberalism-cosmopolitanism and patriotism-nationalism. In his writings, B. Hilary Putnam proposes loyalty to what is best in the multiple traditions in which each of us participates, apparently a middle way between a narrow-minded patriotism and an overly abstract cosmopolitanism Putnam The compromise has been foreshadowed by Berlin and Taylor , , [ 19 ] and in the last two decades it has occupied center stage in the debate and even provoked re-readings of historical nationalism in its light.
Here are then the main weakenings of classical ethno-nationalism that liberal, limited-liberal, and cosmopolitan nationalists propose. First, ethno-national claims have only prima facie strength and cannot trump individual rights.
Second, legitimate ethno-national claims do not in themselves automatically amount to the right to a state, but rather to the right to a certain level of cultural autonomy. The main models of autonomy are either territorial or non-territorial: the first involves territorial devolution; the second, cultural autonomy granted to individuals regardless of their domicile within the state. Finally, any legitimacy that ethno-national claims may have is to be derived from choices the concerned individuals are free to make.
Consider now the particular pro-nationalist arguments from the first set. The first argument depends on assumptions that also appear in the subsequent ones, but it further ascribes to the community an intrinsic value. The later arguments point more towards an instrumental value of nation, derived from the value of individual flourishing, moral understanding, firm identity and the like.
Taylor concluded that it is not separateness of value that matters. We are forbidden to make judgments of comparative value, for that is measuring the incommensurable. Assuming that the ethno- nation is the natural unit of culture, the preservation of cultural diversity amounts to institutionally protecting the purity of ethno- national culture. David Miller has developed an interesting and sophisticated liberal pro-national stance over the course of decades from his work in to the most recent work in He accepts multicultural diversity within a society but stresses an overarching national identity, taking as his prime example British national identity, which encompasses the English, Scottish, and other ethnic identities.
A skeptic could note the following. However, multi-cultural states typically bring together groups with very different histories, languages, religions, and even quite contrasting appearances. One seems to have a dilemma. Grounding social solidarity in national identity requires the latter to be rather thin and seems likely to end up as full-on, unitary cultural identity.
Thick constitutional patriotism may be one interesting possible attitude that can ground such solidarity while preserving the original cultural diversity. The arguments in the second set concern political justice and do not rely on metaphysical claims about identity, flourishing, and cultural values. They appeal to actual or alleged circumstances that would make nationalist policies reasonable or permissible or even mandatory , such as a the fact that a large part of the world is organized into nation-states so that each new group aspiring to create a nation-state just follows an established pattern , or b the circumstances of group self-defense or of redressing past injustice that might justify nationalist policies to take a special case.
Some of the arguments also present nationhood as conducive to important political goods, such as equality. These political arguments can be combined with deep communitarian ones.
More remote from classical nationalism than the liberal one of Tamir and Nielsen, it eschews any communitarian philosophical underpinning. Given the variety of pluralistic societies and intensity of trans-national interactions, such openness seems to many to be the only guarantee of stable social and political life see the debate in Shapiro and Kymlicka In general, the liberal nationalist stance is mild and civil, and there is much to be said in favor of it.
It tries to reconcile our intuitions in favor of some sort of political protection of cultural communities with a liberal political morality. Very liberal nationalists such as Tamir divorce ethno-cultural nationhood from statehood. Also, the kind of love for country they suggest is tempered by all kinds of universalist considerations, which in the last instance trump national interest Tamir ; passim, see also Moore and Gans In the last two decades, the issues of nationalism have been increasingly integrated into the debate about the international order see the entries on globalization and cosmopolitanism.
The main conceptual link is the claim that nation-states are natural, stable, and suitable units of the international order. A related debate concerns the role of minorities in the processes of globalization see Kaldor Moreover, the two approaches might ultimately converge: a multiculturalist liberal nationalism and a moderate, difference-respecting cosmopolitanism have a lot in common.
This section will pay attention to right-wing populist movements, very close to their traditional nationalist predecessors. This corresponds to the situation in the biggest part of Europe, and in the US, where nationalist topics are being put forward by the right-wing populist.
Populism, so defined, has two opposites: elitism and pluralism. First, there is the elite vs. The second, horizontal dimension distinguishes the predominantly left-wing from the predominantly right-wing populisms and leaves a place for a centrist populist option. Take classical strong ethnic nationalism. The relation between right-wing populism and such a nationalism is very tight. The term captures exactly the synthesis of populism and the strong ethnic nationalism or nativism. From nationalism, it takes the characterization of the people: it is the ethnic community, in most cases the state-owing ethnic community, or the ethno-nation.
In his work, Mudde documents the claim that purely right-wing populists claim to represent the true people who form the true nation and whose purity is being muddied by new entrants. In the United States, one can talk about populist and reactionary movements, like the Tea Party, that have emerged through the recent experience of immigration, terrorist attacks, and growing economic polarization.
We have to set aside here, for reasons of space, the main populist alternative or quasi-alternative to national populism. In some countries, like Germany, some populist groups-parties e. Others combine this appeal with the ethno-national one. A simple case: Your favorite restaurant can charge you higher prices — say, from a few cents to a dollar — than those printed on the menu.
If caught, your waiter can say it was a mistake. But how many people ever bother to remember the exact menu prices when the bill lands on the table? Very few, if any. This window of opportunity for cheating exists in thousands of activities in every conceivable industry.
And if citizens actually exploited it, interpersonal trust would disintegrate. Business activity would slow to an inefficient crawl as people spent additional time and effort deterring cheaters. On the other hand, when citizens are nationalistic, those who might cheat will face an unpleasant trade-off: to help themselves at the expense of their brethren. Surely, nationalism will never stop all cheating. But in countries with a mature sense of nationalism, this trade-off will significantly discourage cheating and promote economic growth.
Meanwhile, without nationalism, citizens do not hesitate to abuse each other, and the threat of underhanded cheating destroys the trust necessary for economic development. One need only recall the fall of the Soviet Union and how the crisis of national identity suffered by its citizens presaged endemic corruption and economic underdevelopment across the post-Soviet states.
The benefits of nationalism could have just remained another untested theory in the pantheon of social science. But today, we have the tools to test it systematically.
In and , the Norway-based ISSP carried out surveys of national identity across 23 and 34 countries, respectively, ranging from established democracies like Australia and the United States to younger ones such as the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In the polls, people were asked about the degree to which they agreed that their country is better than most. The stronger this sense of national superiority, the higher the level of nationalism. One finding is immediately apparent: Across the board, countries with a higher average level of nationalism were consistently wealthier.
This evidence flies in the face of the antinationalism harbored by many economists. In truth, though, the problem with many poorer countries is that their citizens are not nationalistic enough.
Consider Eastern European states such as Latvia and Slovenia, which many fear contain the seeds of hypernationalism. Contrary to the conventional wisdom, these countries are actually among the least nationalistic of the group. And rich Western countries, such as Australia, Canada, and the United States, score as the most nationalistic. If nationalism fosters altruism, its effects should be visible in political and social life as well.
Consider corruption. Research in this area is still relatively scant, but it is apparent that there is a broad relationship between nationalism and the ability to keep corruption in check. Using corruption estimates from the World Bank and the same survey data on nationalism, another positive effect of nationalism emerges: Corruption is consistently lower in countries with higher levels of nationalism.
How does nationalism reduce corruption? For many of the same reasons that it improves the economy. Just like parties to a business transaction, public servants who contemplate corruption face an unsavory trade-off: to profit at the expense of fellow nationals. So, if bureaucrats are highly nationalistic, they are also more sensitive to any damage to society, and less prone to abuse public office. Nationalism also changes the mind-set of those affected by corruption.
A nationalistic public is less likely to accept government corruption and simply look the other way. On the other hand, without nationalism, the purely selfish citizen might not care about corruption at all. To this person, the diluted cost of corruption in his or her life is minimal compared with the effort required to fight it.
But a nationalistic citizenry gauges the effect of corruption on the entire nation, and this greater concern for potential abuse triggers the collective response that keeps corruption in check. In social life, too, nationalism makes its presence felt. As nationalistic citizens care more about each other, they are less likely to break the law and violate the rights of others. The countries endowed with a higher level of nationalism tend to have a stronger rule of law.
So what about the cases of nationalism gone bad? Do they tell us anything useful? Yes and no. From power-hungry Napoleonic France to Serbia during the s, these cases show that nationalist aberrations are possible only when other forces are at play.
One such factor is military power. When technological advances and military tactics allow for the easy conquest of other countries, nationalism might be tempted to expand. Similarly, Adolf Hitler exploited German nationalism at a time when blitzkrieg tactics could prove devastating. Nationalism can also be dangerous whenever a single territory is contested by many nations, especially when there is a history of violence among them.
When these conditions exist, as in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, civil war is a real possibility. Young democracies are also at a higher risk of virulent nationalism. In these democratizing states, ambitious leaders might pursue risky strategies — such as invading a neighbor — to boost the immature nationalism of their people for their own motives.
However, the important thing about these unsavory forms of nationalism is how rare and sporadic they really are. To cite a few cases as proof that nationalism is always harmful or barbaric is to confuse the exception with the rule. Most developed strains of nationalism do not promote aggressive expansionism or the abuse of minorities within their borders.
That is because contemporary nations are usually missing these other, high-risk conditions. They exist in a world where war is expensive, borders are largely settled, and the actions of nations are usually tied to some moral code. As a result, nationalism today often leads citizens to look inward and focus their energies on bettering their countries.
With nationalism, this is clearly not happening. To be sure, the broad relationships outlined here ought to be further dissected.
Perhaps nationalism does not matter much when we account for a host of other factors, such as educational levels and natural resources. A debate could be had about whether nationalism is helpful or simply harmless. At the very least, though, we must move past the simplistic notion that nationalism is only dangerous. What it is, is misunderstood. Of course, scholars can persist in looking down on nationalism as a backward, unevolved reflex, and governments could continue to fail to develop policies that harness its potential.
But this alternative carries a heavy cost.
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